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TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
FOR THE EDITORIAL PROCESS IN
LIBEL SUITS?-HERBERT V. LANDO
For the past twenty years,' and especially since the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 2 federal courts have
tried to resolve the question of whether the First Amendment pro-
vides a testimonial privilege for the news media. This privilege, it is
argued, protects from compelled disclosure at trial, the identity of a
reporter's confidential sources as well as any confidential information
obtained from those sources. In Herbert v. Lando,3 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals not only recognized the existence of a qualified
testimonial privilege for the news media, but further held that for
purposes of pre-trial discovery in a libel case, the First Amendment
affords the press an absolute privilege in matters where it exercises
its editorial judgment.4
In Lando, retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Anthony
B. Herbert filed a defamation suit in federal district court against
several defendants, including Barry Lando, 5 producer of a CBS "60
Minutes" segment entitled "The Selling of Colonel Herbert." 6 The
telecast examined, in an unfavorable light, Herbert's allegations of
Vietnam War atrocities and subsequent coverups. 7 During pre-trial
discovery, Lando released numerous exhibits, interview transcripts,
reporters' notes, video tapes of interviews as well as a series of drafts
of the telecast. He also answered innumerable questions relating to
1. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), was the first
federal case which dealt with an asserted testimonial privilege from revealing confidential
sources. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text infra.
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See notes 49-59 and accompanying text infra.
3. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1483 (1978).
4. The term "editorial judgment" or "editorial process" is never actually defined by the
court. While it generally pertains to the choice of material, decisions as to content, and the
gathering of information which culminates in* some form of publication or broadcast, the actual
boundaries of this concept are unresolved.
5. The other defendants in this suit were Mike Wallace, the television commentator for the
Herbert segment, CBS and the Atlantic Monthly Company which had published an article
written by Lando about his investigation of Herbert. The Atlantic Monthly Company was not
involved in this appeal from the district court's interlocutory order.
6. The program appeared on CBS in February of 1973.
7. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert was a much-decorated Army officer who spent
twenty-four years in military service. From September, 1968 to April, 1969, Herbert served
with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Viet Nam. On April 4, 1969, Herbert was relieved as
Commander of the 2nd Battalion. While in Viet Nam, Herbert had allegedly reported a number
of U.S. war atrocities to his superior officers. After an apparent coverup and lack of any satisfac-
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these matters. Lando, however, refused to answer a number of
queries as to his beliefs, opinions, intent and conclusions while pre-
paring the program. Herbert's subsequent motion to compel discov-
ery of this information was granted by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.8
In recognition of the first impression issue as to "whether the First
Amendment erects any barriers to discovery of the editorial pro-
cess," 9 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted an interlocutory
appeal10 from the district court's order. The circuit court held that
tory investigation into these matters, Herbert brought charges against two of his superior offi-
cers. Herbert later filed a formal complaint with the Inspector General's Office. As a result of
these charges Herbert received much news publicity and subsequently appeared on a number
of national talk shows. Producer Barry Lando, after investigating some of the allegations made
by Herbert, uncovered a number of discrepancies in Herbert's story. Lando's efforts culhninated
in the CBS presentation entitled "'The Selling of Colonel Herbert." Herbert then instituted a
defamation claim alleging $44,725,000 in damages to his reputation and financial impairment to
his book "Soldier". Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.1). 387, 391 (S.I1.N.Y. 1977).
8. 73 F.R.1). 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
9. 568 F.2d at 983.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1974) l)rovides in part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate ter-
minitiion of the litigation, lie shall so state in writing in such an order. The Court of
Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order ....
While interlocutory appeals from discovery orders are rare, they are not nonexistent. See
Carev v. Home, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974) (certification
under § 1292(b) granted upon FED. R. Ci\'. P. 37 (a) compelling defendant newspaper reporter,
in a libel action, to disclose identity of eyewitness sources); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (certification under § 1292(b) granted with respect to district court's order
denying availability of attorney-client privilege in suit by stockholders against corporation);
Time, Inc., v. McLanev, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969) (§ 1292(b) certification granted following
denial of motion for summary judgment in a libel suit). Contra, Alexander v. United States, 201
U.S. 117 (1906); Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843 (3(1 Cir. 1969) (interlocutory appeal from a
discovery order denied hecause it was found not to be a final order).
Judge Haight, in his Memorandum Opinion and Order, ruled that the touchstones of 1292(b)
were satisfied. In so holding, he quoted Judge Feinberg, who stated:
When a discovery question is of extraordinary significance or there is extreme need
for reversal of the district court's mandate before the case goes to judgment, there
are escape hatches from the finality rule: a certification by the district court tinder
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), apparently not sought here, or an extraordinary writ.
Herbert v. Lando, No. 74 Civ 434-CSH, slip op. at 9 quoting Judge Feinberg in American
Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 282 (2(1 Cir. 1967). See also
Christian Echoes Nat. Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1968); Grover,
Christie & Merrit v. LoBianco, 337 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Radient Burners, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). Bit see United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784
(9th Cir. 1959) (court held that an order to produce doctuonents over a claim of privilege did not
involve a "controlling question of law" within the meaning of § 1292(b)).
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answers to questions, posed by Herbert, which delved into Lando's
opinions, thoughts and conclusions on matters relating to the prepara-
tion of the telecast, came within the ambit of the "editorial process"
and therefore were constitutionally immune from compelled disclo-
sure. 11
After presenting a brief historical development of the current con-
stitutional standards in the area of libel, this Note will discuss and
analyze a series of cases in which testimonial privileges were asserted.
It will focus, in particular, upon the competing interests inherent in
these cases and the test applied by courts in deciding whether or not
to grant such a privilege. It is a contention of this Note that the court
in Lando failed to address the limited nature of the testimonial
privilege as discussed in these cases. In addition, it will argue that
the Second Circuit's reliance on Supreme Court decisions in Miami
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 12 and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 13 to support its assertion that the
editorial process should be absolutely privileged, is misplaced. Finally
this Note will discuss the potentially disruptive effect that Lando may
have upon the delicate balance of competing interests presented in a
libel case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 14
BACKGROUND
Implicit in the maintenance of a free and demrocratic society is the
corresponding duty of its citizenry to make informed decisions of a
social, political and economic nature. 15 A free press 16 plays a vital
role in our society by insuring a constant flow of information so as to
11. 568 F.2d at 984.
12. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
13. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 27-33 and accompanying text infra.
15. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15
(1963). Emerson suggests four values which a system of free expression seeks to protect: (1)
assurance of individual self-fulfillment; (2) attainment of truth; (3) on-going participation by our
society in social and political decision-making; and (4) maintenance of the balance between sta-
bility and change in our society, Id. at 3. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
16. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment is also
applicable to actions by the executive and judiciary branches, including the issuance of sub-
poenas in connection with federal investigations and proceedings. See, e.g., Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957). The First Amendment also applies to state governments by
reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., New York Times
Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
The Supreme Court in its adjudication of First Amendment cases has defined the phrase "the
press" expansively so as to include many different forms of "expression." The following are
12631978]
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provide to the public the necessary tools with which to make these
informed decisions. To facilitate this exchange of ideas or "mar-
ketplace" concept, 17 the Supreme Court has recognized certain corol-
lary rights to a free press. Among these is a right to be free from
prior governmental restraint' 8 and governmental devices which might
effectively inhibit the public dissemination of news 19 as well as a rec-
ognition by the Court that the freedom to print is an unrequited lib-
erty unless one has a right to receive that printed material. 20 In
addition, the Court has acknowledged three separate yet interrelated
examples of areas which the Court has held to come within the ambit of the "press". See, e.g.,
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (newspaper); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969) (dictun) (radio); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967) (magazines); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-40 (1965) (dictum) (tele-
vision); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (non-commercial advertise-
ments); Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (motion pictures); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-06 (1940) (signs); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939) (leaflets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (pamphlets).
17. In advocating First Amendment protection for the distribution of anti-war leaflets (luring
World War I, Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), estab-
lished the marketplace analogy and declared the discovery of truth to be the goal best served by
its maintenance. Justice Holmes stated:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have
no doubts of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition ...
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of troth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our consitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Id. at 630. It is this analogy to a marketplace of ideas that has been used as a basis tbr up-
holding First Amendment freedoms. See also Learned Hand's definition of the interest pro-
tected by the First Amendment, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950).
18. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Nebraska Press Ass'o v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976). See also Lando, 568 F.2d at 989 & n. 18.
19. The Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), held uncon-
stitutional, as a restraint upon both publication and circulation, a special license tax applicable
only to newspapers with circulation in excess of 20,000 copies per week. The Court recognized
that the tax would deter circulation in excess of 20,000 and therefore limit the flow of news to
the public. Id. at 244-45.
20. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). This case involved a challenge to
legislation which required the Postmaster General to detain unsealed foreign mailings of "com-
munist political propoganda" and to release the same only upon the addressee's request. The
statute was held to violate the addressee's First Amendment right to receive information be-
cause it imposed upon him an affirmative obligation of requesting delivery, and he therefore
might be deterred from performing the necessary steps in order to receive the information.
Justice Brennan reasoned that the First Amendment protected dissemination of ideas and that
such "dissemination can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to re-
ceive and consider them." Id. at 308. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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functions of the press: acquisition; 21 dissemination; 22 and gathering of
information. 23
These protected rights, however, do not operate in a legal vacuum.
At times, the operation of free press conflicts with, and potentially
impedes the realization of other societal interests. 24  Among these
interests is an acknowledged need to preserve the integrity of an in-
dividual's reputation. Such is the basis for the law of defamation. 25
Yet, an opposing interest advanced by the press and supported by the
courts, that "the public has a right to be informed," has produced
serious inroads into the law of libel.2 6 Consequently, in certain in-
21. See Lando, 568 F.2d at 976 n. 3.
22. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In
Martin, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional, as a denial of freedom of speech and press,
an ordinance which prohibited the door-to-door distribution of handbills and circulars. Despite
the 'argument advanced that the ordinance was a reasonable use of police powers, the Court
stated that "[f0reedomn to distribute information to every citizen where ever he desires to
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that .. . it must be fully
preserved." 319 U.S. at 146.
23. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In rejecting the assertion of a qualified
privilege for the newsmedia from compelled disclosure of confidential sources, the Court also
stated that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." 1I. at 681. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion also noted that "[t]he Court
does not hold that newsmen ...are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering
of news or in safeguarding their sources." Id. at 709. See also Note, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public and the
Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
24. Freedom of the press has also collided with other constitutionally guaranteed rights.
This conflict is perhaps most keen when the newsmedia's assertion of an absolute privilege from
compelled discovery collides with a criminal defendant's right to compel testimony and his right
to a fair trial. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury ...(and) to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in
his favor ..." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Where these rights collide the Supreme Court has
recognized that those of the press give way to those of the accused. See Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963). See also United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 215 (D.D.C. 1972) (privilege denied
in favor of an accused's right to a fair trial.)
25. While the law of civil defamation is ever evolving, see F.L. HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL
(1818) and C. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1971) for a presentation of the
historical developments of the law of defamation, it generally seeks to redress an individual
whose reputation has been impaired by some false and derogatory speech or writing. A libel
action, such as the situation in Lando, is usually defined as a malicious publication, expressed
in printing or writing, which damages the plaintiff's reputation and exposes him to ridicule, con-
tempt and public hatred. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Beane v. Weiman
Co., 5 N.C. App. 276, 168 S.E.2d 236 (1969). See also EATON, TlE AMERICAN LAW OF DEF-
AMATION THROUGH GERTZ v. ROBERT WELCH, INC. AND BEYOND: AN ANALYTICAL PRIMER,
61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975).
26. Despite the fact that the law of defamation focuses primarily upon redressing the libeled
or slandered individual, the law has also reflected the public interest of allowing a person to
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stances, the societal interest in self integrity has been subordinated to
a desire that "debate on public issues ... be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open . ,"27
The tension raised by these two competing interests led to the
Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 28 Sul-
livan injected constitutional considerations into the law of libel by
holding that under the First Amendment, the press will be held
blameless for printing fiictual misstatements about public officials tin-
less the press acted with "actual malice. '"29 Later decisions enlarged
the constitutional privilege to include misstatements regarding public
figures a° as well as "matters of public or general concern."-3 1  Still
others have required that a subjective standard be applied in order to
reach a finding of actual malice and, as a result, reckless disregard,
the subjective element of actual malice, is present if the publisher "in
fiact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication," or if
"there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or
the accuracy of his reports." 32 Thus, in Sullivan and the series of
cases following it, the Supreme Court has subordinated the rights of
private litigants to the public interest in a free and vigorous press by
speak or write without impending fear of civil liabilitv. It is within this context that the press
has sought constitutional protection. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra. See also
Hearings Before the Subcooun. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-1972).
27. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court reversedi a jury verdict which held the New
York Times liable in a defamation suit for publishing a non-commercial full page ad describing
certain alleged activities by police against black demonstrators in Montgomery, Alabama.
29. The requirement of actual malice was first raised in Sullivan where the court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, ve think, a federal rule that prohibits a pub-
lic official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
Id. at 279-80.
30. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court described a public
figure-plaintiff as one who because of status or conduct is the volintary subject of continuing
and substantial public interest independent of the publication at issue, and who therefore has
access to the means of counterargument sufficient to rebut the defamatory falsehood directed at
him. Id. at 154-55. Since Herbert conceded that be was a "public figure" in a libel action
governed by Sullivan, the Court did not have to deal with this oftentimes difficult characteriza-
tion. Brief for Appellee at 16, Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, (2d Cir. 1977).
31. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) held that constitutional protection
is to be extended to "all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.' Id. at 44.
32. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968). See also Curtis Publishing Co, v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1964).
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severely limiting the right of recovery for libel and invasion of pri-
vacy. 33
The competing interests of an asserted First Amendment protection
for the editorial process and the right to preserve an individual's
reputation form the background and basis for the decision rendered
by the Second Circuit in Lando. In reaching its conclusion that the
First Amendment recognizes an absolute privilege for the editorial
process, 34 Judge Kaufnan in his majority opinion relied primarily upon
three Supreme Court decisions. 35 The court stated that since
Bra nzburg v. Hayes recognized a qualified testimonial privilege for
the news media, and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo and
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee
protected the editorial functions of newspapers and broadcast media
from governmental intrusions, it had no other choice but to conclude
that the "editorial process must equally be safeguarded." 36
THE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE CASES
While the issue of a First Amendment protection for the editorial
process is one of first impression, the nature of the dispute in Lando
is analogous to those cases wherein reporters and other individuals
sought to protect the identity of confidential sources and information
from compelled pre-trial discovery. Judge Kaufman's reliance on
these cases is evidenced by his discussion of Branzburg v. Hayes,37
33. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); See also Note, The Demise of the Public
Figure in Defamation Cases and the Ascent of a Responsible Press, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 863
(1977).
34. The majority opinion in Lando never specifically states that the privilege granted is
absolute. The Court, however, did imply this conclusion when it stated:
These reciprocal developments in the law of libel and in freedom of the press nar-
rowly define our task: we must permit only those procedures in libel actions which
least conflict with the principle that debate on public issues should be robust and
uninhibited. If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journalist formulated
his judgments on what to print or not to print, we would be condoning judicial
review of the editor's thought processes.
568 F.2d at 980.
To further bolster this conclusion, both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lando make
clear the fact that Judge Kaufman recognized an absolute privilege for the editorial process. Id.
at 984 & 996.
35. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972).
36. 568 F.2d at 978.
37. 408 U.S. 655 (1972) discussed in Lando, 568 F.2d at 977. See Judge Oakes' reference to




the first testimonial privilege case to be decided by the Supreme
Court, and other privilege cases. 38  An analysis of these cases will
show that while Branzburg recognized a qualified testimonial
privilege, subsequent cases have generally limited the application of
this privilege to non-libel civil actions. 39
The claim by reporters of a privilege from revealing certain confi-
dences, so as to protect their sources and to assure future "revela-
tions," is an interest which conflicts with federal policy that allows
broad discovery.40 Under this policy, if the material or information
requested is at all relevant to the subject matter of the case, 41 discov-
ery is allowed despite the fact that the materials would be inadmissa-
ble at trial. 42 Furthermore, as long as "such information will have
some probable effect on the organization and presentation of moving
party's case," 43 or is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence,4 4 the information is also subject to discovery.
The first federal case to deal with this issue of whether to grant a
testimonial privilege or to allow broad discovery was Garland v.
Torre.45 In this libel action brought by actress Judy Garland against
the Columbia Broadcasting System, the Second Circuit rejected a
newspaper columnist's claim of a testimonial privilege from revealing
the names of CBS executives who allegedly made the defamatory re-
38. 568 F.2d at 977-78 & no. 11-12.
39. See notes 45-74 and accompanying text infra.
40. As noted in one case: "It has long been held that the deposition-discovery rules are to
be accorded broad and liberal treatment. Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 356
F. Supp. 1394, 1396(D.D.C. 1973).
41. In Cox v. E.I. )uPont de Nemours & Co., 38 F.R.D. 396 (D.S.C. 1965), the court
stated: "Indeed it is not too strong to say that discovery should be considered relevant where
there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the
action." Id. at 398 quoting WRIGHT: FEDERAL COURTS at 310-11 (1963). See also Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.56(1) at 120-22 (2d ed. 1976)
and cases cited therein; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
2007 (1975).
42. See Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Coggeshall 280 F.2d 654 (D.C.Cir. 1960).
43. Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 473 (1975). See generally PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOVERY, ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE'S EXPLANATORY STATEMENT CONCERNING AMENDMENTS OF THE DISCOVERY RULES, 48
F.R.D. 487 (1970).
44. See Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973); E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D.Del. 1959). Despite the gen-
eral rule allowing broad discovery, the federal rules limit its scope in two particular instances:
(1) where the information or material sought is "privileged", FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (1); and (2)
where the court finds that the scope of discovery subjects deponent to "annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
45. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
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marks. While the opinion ackowledged the vital role of the press in a
free society, the court stated that freedom of the press was not abso-
lute. 46  In rejecting the privilege, Circuit Judge Potter Stewart found
that the information requested by Garland was material, relevant and
more importantly, "went to the heart of plaintiff's claim." 47  This
three-pronged or "compelling need" test, to determine whether the
court should grant a privilege, has been applied in one form or
another in almost every civil action in which a privilege from reveal-
ing confidential sources or information has been asserted. 48
This privilege issue was finally addressed by the Supreme Court in
Branzburg v. Hayes.4 9  In Branzburg and its companion cases,
Caldwell v. United States 50 and In re Pappas,51 the Court was pre-
sented with two major issues: (1) whether a reporter who was witness
to a crime could, under the First Amendment, be compelled to tes-
46. Id. at 548.
47. Id. at 550. The record revealed that Miss Garland had actively taken independent steps
to determine the identity of the confidential news source. Three CBS executives were deposed
and all three denied knowing the identity of the network executive referred to in the Herald
Tribune column. In view of these denials, the identity of Miss Torre's source became essential
to the libel action.
48. Justice Stewart argued for such a test in his dissenting opinion in Branzburg when he
stated:
Accordingly, when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal
confidences, I would hold that the government must (1) show that there is probable
cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a
specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought can-
not be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights;
and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.
408 U.S. 655, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
50. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972). Caldwell involved a reporter from the New York Times who had gained the trust of the
Black Panther Party in Oakland, California. In an article written by Caldwell, he quoted a
Panther leader who advocated the violent overthrow of the government and stated that he was
going to assassinate President Nixon. A federal grand jury was called to investigate the Panthers
and Caldwell was subpoenaed to testify as to the "aims, purposes, and activities" of this organi-
zation. Id. at 1083 n.2. The district court denied Caldwell's motion to quash the subpoena but
entered a protective order which precluded the disclosure of his confidential sources and infor-
mation obtained in order to facilitate "his efforts to gather news for dissemination to the public
through the press and other news media." In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Cal.
1970). Upon his continued refusal to appear before the grand jury despite the protective order,
the district court held Caldwell in contempt, and he appealed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that absent any showing by the government that the information would in any way benefit
the grand jury, Caldwell need not appear.
51. 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), aff'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972). In Pappas, a television newsperson was allowed to enter the New Bedford, Mas-
sachusetts headquarters of the Black Panthers during a wave of civil disturbances. Because of
his continued promises of confidentiality to the Panthers, Pappas refused to divulge to a state
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tify before a grand jury as to what he had seen; and (2) whether a
reporter could be ordered to appear before the grand jury in order to
claim a privilege against testifying.
52
Here the Court rejected the testimonial privilege claimed by each
of the reporters 53 and actually held that there was a presumption
against the existence of such a privilege. 54  However, cases decided
since Branzburg have limited the majority opinion to situations
where journalists are being compelled to divulge confidential sources
before a grand july investigation into criminal matters. 55  Further-
more, those courts which have granted a testimonial privilege from
compelled discovery have often relied upon Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Branzburg,56 where he qualified the Court's holding
by stating:
grand jury any information surrounding his visit to Panther headquarters on an evening when a
police raid had been anticipated. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the denial
of Pappas' motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the grand jury was an Ippropriate
device to determine the cause of the civil disorder in New Bedford. Id. at 607, 266 N.E.2d at
299 (1971). The court also relied on the fact that Massachusetts did not have a shield law which
protected a reporter's confidences and therefore a newsperson had no statutory right to refuse
to appear and testify before the grand jury. Id. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03.
52. Branzburg was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who had obtained informa-
tion from confidential sources, pertaining to the alleged manufacture, sale and use of drugs in
Kentucky. Shortly after the publication of two of his articles, two separate grand juries con-
vened to investigate illegal drug traffic. When summoned before both grand juries, Branzburg
was asked to reveal the identity of his sources as well as other confidential information obtained
from them. Branzburg refised, claiming protection under: the Kentucky shield statute, KY.
REv. STAT. § 421.100 (1972), which protects from disclosure, in any legal proceeding, the
source of any confidential information; the Kentucky constitution, Ky. CONST. §§ 1, 2, 8; and
the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 1. After finding that Branzburg had abandoned his
constitutional claims, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the shield law did not permit him
to refuse to reveal the indentity of his sources when such information was sought in the investi-
gation of alleged criminal activity. The Court subsequently ordered him to testify.
53. In Branzburg, as well as Caldwell and Pappas, each reporter argued for a qualified
privilege from compelled disclosure of confidential information and sources. The test articulated
by each was essentially the same: that the privilege should prevail unless the government could
show a "compelling need" for the information sought by a showing of relevancy, materiality and
on inability to obtain the information elsewhere. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the
Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 714 (1975). As early as
1934 the American Newspaper Guild adopted as a part of its code of ethics the following:
"[Njewspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential informa-
tion in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies. G. BIRD & F. MERWIN, TH-sE
NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY 567 (1942).
54. 408 U.S. 655, 686 (1972) citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
55. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972).
56. A number of courts have cited Powell's concurring opinion to conclude that Branzburg
recognizes a qualified privilege. See, e.g., Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla.
1975); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Democratic Na-
tional Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.C.C. 1973); Spiva v. Francouer, 39 Fla.
Supp. 49 (Dade County Jud. Cir. 1973).
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The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify be-
fore a grand jury, are without consitutional rights with respect to
the gathering of information or in safeguarding their sources ...
Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject matter of the
investigation . . . he will have access to the Court on a motion to
quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.
57
Two years later in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. ,58 Justice Powell, in
his dissenting opinion, took the opportunity to fully describe the lim-
ited nature of Branzburg, and in addition, pointed out that a decision
to grant a testimonial privilege depended upon the competing societal
interests involved in each case.
59
The civil action testimonial privilege cases decided since Garland
and Branzburg can be divided into two categories, libel and non-
libel, with each category having its own distinguishing factors and set
of competing interests. One of the distinguishing factors of the non-
libel cases is that the journalist summoned to reveal his or her confi-
dences is not normally a party to the suit. Furthermore, the informa-
tion requested is sought merely to bolster the plaintiff's case. Such a
situation was presented in Baker v. F&F Investment. 60  Here, the
57. 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
58. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
59. In Saxbe, Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, went to great lengths in explaining
and limiting the application of Branzburg. Powell stated that the reason the assertion of a
qualified testimonial privilege from grand jury investigation was rejected was on the ground that
"the largely speculative public interest 'in possible fitnre news about crime from indisclosed,
unverified sources' could not override the competing interest 'in pursuing and prosecuting those
crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes
in the future.'" Id. at 858, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 695 (1972).
Justice Powell further stated that:
Branzbrg does not endorse . . . a rejection of First Amendment challenges to
restraints on access to news. The Court did not hold that the government is wholly
free to restrict press access to newsworthy information. To the contrary, we recog-
nized explicitly that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press does ex-
tend to some of the antecedent activities that make the right to publish meaningful
.... And I emphasized the limited nature of the Branzburg holding in my concur-
ring opinion: 'The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before
a grand jury, are without constitutiontal rights with respect to the gathering of news
or in safeguarding their sources.. .... In addition to these explicit statements, a
fair reading of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result
hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests involved in that case
rather than on any determination that First Amendment freedoms were not impli-
cated.
417 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
60. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). Baker presented the
privilege issue in a federal class action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Plaintiff
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Second Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to force disclosure 6'
by a non-party journalist of his confidential source based on the lower
court's finding that plaintiff had made no showing of relevance, neces-
sity 62 or that disclosure of the source went to the heart of his
claim. 63 Hence, a compelling need was not proven and the claim of
privilege was upheld. A qualified privilege was upheld on similar
grounds64 in Democratic National Committee v. McCord.65 Besides
those factors articulated in Baker, the court also noted that alternative
sources had not been sought out or even approached by the plain-
tiff. 66
The decisions in these and other non-libel cases 67 have consistently
applied a compelling need test and have held that where the indi-
viduals subpoenaed were not parties to the underlying action, where
the parties made no adequate showing of materiality and relevancy,
where alternative sources for obtaining the information were not
exhausted or where the information sought did not go to the heart of
plaintiff's claim, the public interest in an unfettered press will gener-
ally prevail in the form of a testimonial privilege. Under such cir-
sought an order to compel disclosure of a journalist's source who had described various dis-
criminatory real estate practices. 1d. at 779-80.
61. Id. at 781.
62. Id. at 784.
63. Id. at 783.
64. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973). In McCord, the federal district court quashed a
subpoena that had been issued to several non-party reporters, newspapers and magazines re-
questing that they produce any and all information in their possession which related to the
Watergate break-in. Id. at 1395. In granting a qualified privilege, the court emphasized that the
subpoenaed groups were not parties to the proceeding, that there was no showing of materiality
and that the information sought did not go to the heart of plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1397-98.
65. Id. at 1397-99.
66. 1d. at 1398.
67. See, e.g., Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). This
case involved a civil action brought by a plaintiff suffering from permanent disabilities that
resulted from the use of an anaesthetic drug. In this suit filed against the manufacturer of the
drug, both the patient and manufacturer moved to compel the non-party publisher of a medical
newsletter to reveal the source of an article containing facts and documentation of reported
deaths from use of the drug. Here, as in Baker and McCord, the competing interests of a free
and untrammeled press prevailed because the parties could not show that they were unable to
obtain the information from any other sources, id. at 80-81, nor could they prove that the
documentation was "essential to the resolution of the judicial controversy." Id. at 82. The court
also noted that: "In a libel case, unlike other civil actions, the reporter or publication is a party
to the suit. Moreover, the identity of the source may be crucial to the claim or defense," Id.
(emphasis added). See also Loadholtz v. Field, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (privilege
denied on the grounds that plaintiff had not exhausted alternative sources); Bursey v. United
States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (disclosure limited to instances where the government can
demonstrate a compelling state interest); Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 302 NE.2d
593 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1973) (court granted a non-party reporter a privilege where it found that
information sought was not relevant to the underlying iroceeding).
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cumstances, requested third party materials are of little consequence
in the face of a potential chilling effect on the press and its sources.
68
The assertion of a testimonial privilege in a libel case, however,
presents a more complex situation. While it is generally conceded
that the need to safeguard open and robust debate is of great impor-
tance, Sullivan and its progeny have not negated completely the
societal interest in preserving the integrity of an individual's reputa-
tion. 6 9 More importantly, the newsperson is usually a party-
defendant in these libel proceedings thus making the information
sought quite relevant to plaintiff's burden in proving actual malice.
These factors have the effect of tipping the scales in favor of disclo-
sure and denying the claim of a testimonial privilege.
These elements were present in Carey v. Huine,70 a libel case, in
which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a lower
court's decision which granted plaintiff's discovery motion to compel
disclosure of defendant's sources for a news article. The court con-
cluded that the information sought from defendant-newspaper did go
to the heart of plaintiff's libel claim 71 and further found that the
identity of the newspaper's sources was most critical to the case. 72
The court also noted the repeated citation to Garland in post-Sullivan
cases which "suggests the continuing vitality of ... [Garland] and
negates any inference that the Court does not consider the interest of
the defamed plaintiff an important one." 73 Courts in other libel
68. See, e.g., Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397
(D.D.C. 1973).
69. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
70. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). In Carey, the news item
in question had charged that the plaintiff, who was general counsel to the United Mine Work-
ers, and the union's president, had surreptitiously removed documents from union headquarters
during a federal investigation of its financial affairs. Id.
71. Id. at 636 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 637. As to the matter of exhausting alternative sources, the court found that due
to the imprecision of defendant's own information and the impracticability of deposing all the
employees of the UMWA, it would not force the litigant to take on "wide-ranging and onerous
discovery burdens when the path is as ill-lighted as that emerging from [defendant's] deposi-
tion." Id. at 639. It is unclear whether Carey is suggesting a new standard. Since these actions
are decided on a case-by-case analysis, Carey may only be attributing some flexibility to the rule
that parties must exhaust alternative sources before trying to compel a journalist to reveal his or
her confidences.
73. Id. at 635 & n.5. Branzburg, and especially Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion,
not only left undisturbed but in fact endorsed the'particularized test used in Garland. But see
Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 302, 562 P.2d 791, 805 (1977) (Donaldson,
J , dissenting) (claiming that Garland would have been decided differently if it had been a
post-Sullivan decision).
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cases have gone as far as not to recognize any form of a testinmonial
privilege for the news media. 74
These civil cases clearly show that the compelling need test first
proposed by Justice Stewart in Garland and reiterated in
Branzburg 75 now appears to be the well established approach in
balancing the competing interests presented in these cases. Because
of the greater degree of difficulty in meeting this test by plaintiffs in
non-libel cases, a qualified privilege is usually granted. However,
libel cases present a different set of competing interests and a
privilege is not so readily recognized. Moreover, in view of the com-
plaining party's burden of proving actual malice, the identity of a re-
porter's confidences and the information itself often times goes to the
heart of plaintiff's claim.
74. In one case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's previous decision in Ill re
Pappas, see note 51 supra, was relied upon in Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass.
317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973), to again show its reluctance to grant a journalist's privilege. Al-
though the court agreed that Branzburg was not controlling, it noted that the denial of' a tes-
timonial privilege in Pappas applied to the entire judicial process and was there'ore not limited
to criminal proceedings. Id. at 320, 303 N.E.2d at 849. But see Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464
F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) where the court stated: "[T]o
'compel a newsman to breach a confidential relationship merely because a libel suit has been
filed against him would seem inevitably to lead to an excessive restraint oin the scope of legiti-
mate newsgathering activity." Id. at 993 n.10. The rule in Cervantes is designed to prevent the
initiation of libel suits merely for the purpose of requiring disclosure of sources. See also Cerrito
v. Time, Inc. 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969). aff'd per curiaoi, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.
1971) (holding that there shall be no disclosure of sources where there is little or no probability
of success under Sullivan).
The court in Dow Jones also distinguished Baker v. F&F Investment, see notes 60-63 and
accompanying text supra, by pointing out that the deponent was a party to the proceeding and
that the information was central to the plaintiff's claim whereas in Baker, neither of these facts
was true. The court also pointed out that unlike New York, where the suit in Baker had been
brought, there had been no shield law enacted in Massachusetts. Moreover, as in Baker, there
was no finding that the judge in the court below had abused his discretion. But see Lando, 568
F.2d at 978 n.12, where the Second Circuit noted that its decision did not rely upon0 the New
York or Illinois shield statutes.
Similarly, in Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791 (1977), the court
refused to grant a newspaper publisher andi a reporter a qualified privilege. Here the court
cited the majority opinion in Branzburg to support its conclusion that no journalist's privilege,
protecting them from divulging confidential sources, exists uder the First Amendment in
either a qualified or absolute form.
Both Dow Jones and Caldero are unique i that they expand rather than limit the holding in
Branzburg to encompass litigation in civil actions. While neither case acknowledges Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, the court i Dow Jones does refer to factors of the compelling need
test. One possible reason why Caldero did not discuss the test was its conclusion that the First
Amendment does not recognize any testimonial privilege thereby negating any need to apply it.
75. See note 47 and accompanying text & note 48 supra.
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ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
While the facts in Lando can be distinguished from those discussed
in the privilege cases above, in that Lando is not seeking to protect a
confidential source or confidential information per se, the analysis of
competing interests and application of the compelling need test are
quite relevant. Although Judge Kaufman followed their lead by taking
note of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg to support
his conclusion that the Supreme Court had acknowledged a testimo-
nial privilege for the newsmedia, his cursory treatment of the subject
area completely glossed over the limited nature of the privilege as
discussed in testimonial privilege cases decided subsequent to
Branzburg.76 In these cases, as noted above, a decision to grant a
privilege was made only upon a finding that the compelling need test
was satisfied. At no time does the Second Circuit even refer to this
test, much less analyze whether its requirements were met. In doing
so, the majority opinion either rejected the compelling need test, or
simply felt its application to be unnecessary since it decided to grant
an absolute rather than a qualified privilege for the editoriaJ pro-
cess. 77 In light of its decision in Baker which applied the test, it is
more likely that the court may have incorrectly felt the analysis was
unnecessary.
Another possible explanation for the court's exclusion of this ap-
proach and its decision to grant an absolute privilege is that if the
Second Circuit had actually applied the test, it would have been hard
pressed in justifying a grant of such a broad privilege in this case. Not
only is Lando a party to the libel proceeding, but on its face, Her-
bert's request had satisfied the requirements of materiality, relevancy
and an inability to obtain the information from alternative sources. 78
In addition, it cannot be denied that Lando's state of mind during the
preparation of the "60 Minutes" program goes to the heart of Her-
bert's defamation action.
A second analysis which the majority opinion seems to have over-
looked pertains to those rules governing the scope of pre-trial discov-
ery. As noted before, 79 the federal rules allow broad discovery of
76. See notes 58-75 and accompanying text supra.
77. Judge Oakes, in his concurring opinion, comments on the test in selecting an appro-
priate level of protection for the editorial process, but only after he concludes that the privilege
is recognized under the First Amendment. 568 F.2d at 994 (Oakes, J., concurring). He also
claims that the compelling interest test applied in Baker and Garland does not control in Lando
because the issues involved did not pertain to the editorial process. Id.
78. See Brief for Appellant at 21-22, Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S.Ct. 1483 (1978).
79. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
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materials which may affect a party's presentation and organization,
which are at all relevant to the subject matter of the case, or which
might lead to other discoverable evidence. Furthermore, discovery
motions on review are not usually reversed unless the appellate court
finds that the district court has abused its broad discretion.8"
Nowhere in Lando is this point ever discussed despite the fact that
Judge Haight's decision not to grant a privilege for the editorial pro-
cess was overturned."1
Safeguarding the Editorial Process
In addition to Branzburg, Judge Kaufman relied upon two other
Supreme Court decisions to hold that the editorial process must be as
equally safeguarded 82 as the "constitutional protection afforded the
80. The Ninth Circuit recently declared that: "'Relevance' on discovery has a very broad
meaning . . .and the question is for the district court." Heathman v. United States Dist. Ct.
for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410
F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1969); Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir.
1958).
Moreover, as stated by Judge Kaufman in Baker: "A motion seeking a discovery ruling is
addressed to the discretion of the district court, and our function on appeal is to determine
whether the trial judge abused his discretion in entering the challenged order .. " Baker v. F
& F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). See also
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
81. Upon receipt of Herbert's request to produce documents for inspection, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 34. Lando and CBS objected to the number of requests as well as to certain questions
which fell into five categories as grouped by the court of appeals:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigation regarding people or
leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the '60 Minutes'
segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind
with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion
concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or
excluded from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain
material.
568 F.2d at 983. Lando contended that answers to these inquiries were protected from disclo-
sure under the privilege afforded the editorial process under the First Amendment. Upon his
refusal to turn over documents or answer questions coming within the amibit of this privilege,
Herbert filed a motion requesting the district court to force Lando to release this information.
On the district court level, Judge Haight ruled in favor of Herbert's Rule 37(a) motion, see FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(a), refusing to acknowledge a discovery privilege for the editorial process. He
held that as a result of a public figure's high burden in proving actual malice tinder Sullivan,
the court should allow broad discovery of defendant's state of mind. 73 F.R.D. 387, 395-96
(S. D. N.Y. 1977).
82. 568 F.2d at 978.
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dissemination and acquisition of information." 8 3 In the first of these
cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,s4 plaintiff grounded
his suit on Florida's 'right to reply' statute8 5 after newspaper-defen-
dant refused to provide equal space in response to an editorial which
was highly critical of his candidacy for public office. The Florida Su-
preme Court reversed the circuit court which had held the statute
unconstitutional as an infringement upon the press.86 In doing so, the
court argued that free speech was actually enhanced by the statute
and was "designed to add to the flow of information and ideas" and
not as "an incursion upon First Amendment rights .... ."87
On appeal, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether editors
or publishers could be compelled to publish that which "reason tells
them should not be published." 8 8 In an unanimous opinion revers-
ing the lower court's decision, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
[T]he Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the functions of editors. A news-
paper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitation on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues-constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process
can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a
free press as they have evolved to this time. 89
83. Id.
84. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1970) provides in part:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election in any election ... or gives to another free space for
such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately
publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in
the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such a reply, provided such reply
does not take up more space than the matter replied to.
86. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1973).
87. Id. at 82.
88. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
89. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). "A newspaper or magazine is not a pub-
lic utility subject to 'reasonable' governmental regulation in matters affecting the exercise of
journalistic judgment as to what should be printed." Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). In
holding this governmental "intrusion" unconstitutional the Court at no time used a balancing
approach even though such an approach was advocated by appellee. See Note, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
174, 178 n.31 (1974). It has been suggested that the reason for this exclusion is that the Sup-
reme Court "sees no legitimate role for the government in rectifying private censorship ....
and in viewing compulsory access statutes as a type of prior restraint, such statutes will be held
presumptively invalid. Id. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 648 (1955).
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The second case relied upon by Judge Kaufman to support his as-
sertion that the First Amendment protects the editorial process was
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee. 90 In that decision, with Chief Justice Burger again writing for
the Court, it was held that neither the First Amendment nor the
Communications Act of 193491 requires broadcasters to accept paid
political advertisements. A plurality of the Court concluded that a
licensee could adhere to the fairness doctrine 92 by providing a more
comprehensive means of presenting a balanced treatment of impor-
tant issues than that provided for by editorial advertising. 93 In addi-
tion, the Court pointed out that this policy determination was funda-
mentally a matter of journalistic judgment to be exercised in the
licensee's capacity as "private entrepreneur." 94  The particular im-
portance of this case as it relates to Lando, is the Court's observation
that "[flor better or for worse, editing is what editors are for; and
editing is selection and choice of material. That editors-newspaper
or broadcast-can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that
is not reason to deny the discretion Congress provided."95
From the discussion of these two cases, Judge Kaufiman concludes
that the thrust of Tornillo and CBS is a desire to "encourage, and
protect against encroachment, fill and candid discussion within the
newsroom itself." 96  However, by limiting these two cases to their
facts, Judge Kaufiman's reliance on Tornillo and CBS seems mis-
placed. Neither case speaks to the assertion of a privilege from com-
pelled disclosure of a party-defendant's confidences in a libel suit
90. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See Comment, Limited Access to Purchase Public Issue Advertising
Time, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 738 (1974); Comment, The Regulation of Competing First Amend-
ment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS?, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1283 (1974).
91. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
92. Based upon the principle that the "airwaves" belong to the public and not only to pri-
vate licensees, the fairness doctrine mandates that a broadcaster provide adequate coverage to
public issues as well as to fairly represent opposing views. See Barrow, The Equal Opportunities
and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L.
REV. 447 (1968); Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness
and Access, 85 HARv. L. REV. 768 (1972).
93. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118-19 (1973).
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. Id. at 124-25.
96. 568 F.2d at 979. Judge Oakes is even more explicit:
Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting recognize the inviolability of the editorial func-
tion. As such they reflect a keen judicial recognition of the role of the press in
American society and its need for protection, a trend that has been evidenced by
practically solid judicial response in favor of protection.
id. at 988-89 (Oakes, J., concurring).
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much less his or her state of mind.97 They stand for the proposition
that the Supreme Court will not condone governmental compulsion of
public access98 to newspapers and the broadcast media. 99 And, as
noted by Judge Meskill in his dissenting opinion in Lando, neither of
these two cases propose that intrusions into the decision-making pro-
cess of editors are prohibited under the First Amendment. 1°°
Furthermore, the distinction between legislative and regulatory
control and judicial intervention is crucial. The governmental inter-
ferences with which Tornillo and CBS were concerned was the pas-
sage of statutes and regulations which attempted to establish control
over the actual content of publications and broadcasts. What was par-
ticularly objectionable in these cases was that the intrusions were of
an editorial and political nature, thereby forcing editors to provide
access to views over which they had no control. While the purpose of
the statutes was to provide public access to the media, the fear in-
stilled by the sanctioning of such alws is that they are seen as the first
step towards direct governmental control over editorial functions. 10
Lando, on the other hand, involved judicial review of a discovery
motion specifically provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. As pointed out before, district court judges are given broad
discretion in determining the proper scope of discovery and are only
reversed when the appellate court finds that this discretion has been
abused. More importantly, Lando involves a private action which
97. See Herbert v. Lando, 73 FR.D. 387, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
98. As used by many recent commentators, "right of access" refers to the theory that broad-
cast licensees may not refuse on mere policy grounds to accept editorial advertisements.
Whether the right is based on the Constitution or on statutory provisions and to what degree it
is limited by the rights of broadcasters to control what is transmitted over their assigned fre-
quencies are matters of intensive debite. See, e.g., J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR
WiiOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS MEIDIA 126-303 (1973); Jaffe, supra note 91, at 780-92;
Note, A Fair Break fir Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the
Need for Individual Access, 39 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 532, 561-67 (1971).
99. It is interesting to note that the cases Judge Kaufman chose to support the need to
acknowledge an absolute privilege for the editorial process so as to maintain a "marketplace of
ideas" are cases which actually limit that concept. Proponents of the access doctrine argue that
as a result of the media monopolies which exist in this country, not only is the flow of disparate
viewpoints constricted, but the failure of the courts to compel access to the news media has the
combined effect of sounding the death knell for the "marketplace" concept. Cases such as Tor-
nillo and CBS, it is argued, merely promote this continued constriction of the interchange of
ideas.
100. 568 F.2d at 997 (Nleskill, J., dissenting).
101. But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973), where the Court upheld the constitutional validity of an ordinance which had prohibited
the use of sex-based help-wanted advertisements.
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seeks only to hold a producer responsible for an alleged defamatory
television program. Neither this libel action nor the district court's
decision to allow discovery into Lando's state of mind seek to control
the editorial content of decision-making process as did the statutues
in Tornillo and CBS. Despite these significant differences between
governmental and judicial "intrusions," the court in Lando drew no
distinction between them and in fact equated the two. 10 2
THE DISRUPTIVE IMPACT OF THE LANDO DECISION
During the past fourteen years, since the decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,'"3 the Supreme Court has established and
maintained a delicate balance between the media's right to criticize
and an individual's right to be protected from defamatory remarks.
The burden placed upon a public figure to prove with "convincing
clarity"104 that the statements made were knowingly false or were
with reckless disregard of the truth has been established to promote
the First Amendment guarantee to uninhibited discussions of public
issues. Furthermore, the Court has refined the element of reckless
disregard by formulating a subjective test in order to determine the
state of mind of the individual with respect to the truthfulness of his
or her published statements. 1 5  This further refinement, however,
has yet to abrogate the right to protect one's reputation and self in-
tegrity. Sullivan did not erect an absolute privilege to publish de-
fanatory statements about public figures. While it indeed made re-
covery more difficult, it did not relieve the press from its responsibil-
ity to the public or from exposure to suit.106
102. 568 F.2d at 982 (Oakes, J., concurring). But see discussion in note 107 infra.
103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
104. Id. at 285-86.
105. In Lando, Judge Kaufmian discussed this "evolving" standard and stated: "The opinions
applying these additional constraints do so in recognition of the constitutional safeguards cloak-
ing the press, and the need to protect editors and broadcasters. They speak with the same voice
as do CBS and Tornillo." 568 F.2d at 979. See Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 556 F.2d
113 (2d Cir. 1977); Buckley v. Littel, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977).
106. Justice White noted that the decision in Tornillo did "not mean that because govern-
ment may not dictate what the press is to print, neither can it afford a remedy for libel in any
form ... [A] putative remedy for libel still remains intact. . . [and] the press certainly remains
liable for knowing or reckless falsehoods under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ... " Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 262 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
In another concurring opinion Justice Brennan remarked that w'hile "the press cannot be
enjoined from reporting certain information, that does not necessarily immunize it from civil
liability for libel or invasion of privacy or from criminal liability for transgressions of general
criminal laws during the course of obtaining that information." Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart,
[Vol. 27:12611280
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The Lando court's conclusion that "the ratio decidendi for Sulli-
van's restraints on libel suits is the concern that the exercise of edito-
rial judgment would be chilled," 107 effectively disrupts the balance of
competing interests previously reached by Sullivan and its progeny.
By creating an absolute privilege for the editorial process, the court
has precluded from discovery direct proof of a defendant's state of
mind. The result is to alter significantly the substantive law of libel
by imposing an even greater burden on plaintiffs in their attempt to
427 U.S. 539, 588 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Goldwater v. Ginsberg, 414 F.2d
324, 337 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1969) where the Second Circuit observed:
"Repetition of another's words does not release one of responsibility if the repeater knows that
the words are false or inherently improbable, or there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity
of the person quoted or the accuracy of his reports." Id. at 337.
107. 568 F.2d at 980. The basic thrust of the Court's argument is that the decision in Lando
merely reflects the spirit and scope of protection afforded the press under the First Amendment
as enunciated in previous Supreme Court decisions. After setting forth a historical and judicial
development of freedom of the press, Judge Kaufman stated: "The acquisition of newsworthy
material stands at the other pole of the press's function. Freedom to cull information is logically
antecedent and necessary to any effective exercise of the right to distribute news. Indeed, the
latter prerogative cannot be given full meaning unless the former right is recognized." 568 F.2d
at 977.
Implicit in this freedom to cull information is the essential element of human judgment which
must constantly probe, investigate and eventually "transform the raw data of reportage into a
finished product." Id. at 978. It is this element of human judgment which the court is seeking
to protect, because it believes that to allow unrestricted discovery into the thought processes of
an editor made during the preparation of a news piece is to "put a freeze on the free inter-
change of ideas within the newsroom." Id. at 980. The Court went further to point out that: "A
reporter or editor, aware .that his thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would
often be discouraged from the creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and
alternatives which are the sine qua non of responsible journalism." Id. at 980. Moreover, the
Court argues that this chilling effect would indirectly subvert the constitutionally protected right
to gather information as well as impede the necessary day-to-day editorial decisions which form
the heart of the editorial process.
Judge Oakes, in his concurring opinion, offered a varied and more in depth analysis in reach-
ing the same conclusion as the majority opinion that the editorial process should be absolutely
privileged. Like Judge Kaufman, he indiscriminately cited the journalist privilege cases to
suggest "by analogy that other First Amendment limitations on discovery in Sullivan cases may
be similarly appropriate." Id. at 986 (Oakes, J., concurring). Judge Oakes also relied upon
Tornillo and CBS to conclude that the editorial process is inviolable and "entitled to special
protection. ... ." Id. at 988.
The heart of Judge Oakes' argument is his assertion that liberal and unrestricted discovery
into the functions of editors acts as a prior restraint in the news media. The doctrine of prior
restraint presumptively invalidates governmental censorship of the news in advance of its publi-
cation or distribution to the public. Id. at 989 n.18. While the decision as to the scope of
discovery in a libel suit does not take place until after the alleged defamatory remarks are made,
Judge Oakes contends that "[t]he broad discovery order in this case operates after publication to
deter editorial choice concerning subsequent publications. Because the order operates as a prior
restraint ... it should be presumed invalid." Id.
According to Judge Oakes, this presumption of invalidity becomes even more compelling
when viewing freedom of the press as a First Amendment protection of a structural entity
1 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
prove actual malice. 10 8 The court in Lando, however, maintained
that it had not altered the balance struck by Sullivan. It was careful
to point out that Lando had been very cooperative in pre-trial discov-
ery by turning over volumes of material and information pertaining to
the creation of the Herbert segment and that the jury could still in-
fer, based on this material, whether or not Lando had defamed Her-
bert. 10 9 Yet to equate the quantity of available evidence with the
quality of evidence needed to meet the issue of subjective proof is to
deny the plaintiff the very evidence that is needed to support his or
her burden of proving actual malice.
The Second Circuit's decision to grant an absolute rather than a qual-
ified privilege was motivated, in part, by its concern that if a plaintiff
is allowed to select only those facts of a reporter's mental process
which are advantageous to his or her position, the threat of distorting the
editorial process then becomes very real.110 The Federal Rules of
Evidence, however, protect against such selective inquiry by enabling
a party to introduce evidence to clarify that which was taken out of
context."' Under the decision in Lando, the situation is now re-
versed. A libel defendant is now free to selectively reveal those inten-
tions, opinions and conclusions which are helpful to his case. The
plaintiff, however, is prohibited from inquiring into the defendant's
versus that of an imprecise concept. Relying exclusively on a speech given to the Yale Law
School by Justice Stewart, Judge Oakes claims that the Supreme Court has distinguished a free
press fron free speech so as "'to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an
additional check on the three official branches.'" Id. at 988, quoting Stewart, "Or of the Press,"
26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
judge Oakes further claims that a "chilling effect" similar to that which results from prior
restraints will similarly result from unbridled discovery of the editorial process. This leads Judge
Oakes to assert that:
Uninhibited discovery into the motivation of the editor in a libel action poses pre-
cisely the same danger sought to be avoided by the landmark cases which have
established the prior restraint as hornbook constitutional law. Accordingly, the prin-
ciples underlying the doctrine necessitate the application of the Free Press guaran-
tee to protect the independence of the press against such discovery.
1d. at 990.
108. In his district court opinion, Judge Haight wrote:
If the malicious publisher is permitted to increase the weight of the injured plain-
tiff's already heavy burden of proof by a narrow and restricted application of the
discovery rules, so that the plaintiff is denied discovery into areas which in the
nature of the case lie solely with the defendant, then the law in effect provides an
arras behind which malicious publication may go undetected and unpunished.
Nothing in the First Amendment requires such a result.
Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.). 387, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
109. 568 F. 2d at 984.
110. Id. at n.23.
111. See FED. R. EvID. 106.
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state of mind so as to put into perspective that evidence revealed by
the defendant. Moreover, by finding this privilege to be constitu-
tional in nature, the plaintiff is precluded fiom relying upon the fed-
eral rules as a remedial measure.
A final criticism of the Lando decision is that in establishing an
absolute privilege, the court set no real guidelines as to what ac-
tivities the editorial process encompasses. 112 Taken to its logical ex-
tremes, the amorphous concept of an "editorial process" could possi-
bly subsume the entire publishing process. Lando was the editor of
the Herbert segment but he was also the reporter whose investigative
effoits culminated in the "60 Minutes" program at issue in this suit.
The question arises, at what point in time do the functions of a
reporter end and those of an editor begin? In this instance, they were
really one and the same. This potential spillover effect into the ac-
tivities of a reporter not only complicates any attempt by future
courts to establish reasonable bounds for the "editorial process," but
could also effectively foreclose any real possibility for recovery in a
defamation action.
CONCLUSION
On its fhce, the First Amendment argument set forth by the Sec-
ond Circuit is appealing. The decision, however, is based more upon
constitutional extrapolation than it is upon precedent. The trilogy of
Branzburg, Tornillo and CBS, upon which the court relies so heavily,
is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Lando. Furthermore, not
only does the court fail to engage in any real analysis of the journalist
privilege cases, it conveniently avoids a balancing of interest and
compelling need approach by suggesting that the First Amendment
provides for an absolute rather than a qualified privilege for the
editorial process.
Moreover, the privilege asserted by Lando was distinctly different
from the testimonial privilege asserted by reporters to protect confi-
dential sources. Here, Lando wanted to preclude from pre-trial dis-
112. Judge Oakes, however, does attempt to define the boundaries of the editorial process:
The obvious starting point, however, is the Chief Justice's delineation in Tornillo:
'The choice of material' to go into the broadcast, "the decisions made' on the dura-
tion and 'content' of the broadcast, and 'treatment of public issues and public offi-
cials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of' editorial control and judg-
ment.' Thus, Tornillo mandates that the mental processes of the press regarding
'choice of material,' duration and 'content' of the broadcast are to be protected from
scrutiny.
568 F.2d at 995 (Oakes. J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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covery that which goes to the very core of this defamation action, that
is, his state of mind. Requiring a public figure to show that the de-
fendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his pub-
lication"' 3 is to force the public figure-plaintiff to delve into the
mind of the alleged defamer 114 in order to sustain his or her burden
of proving actual malice as mandated by Sullivan. To deny discovery
of facts which would reveal a libel defendant's state of mind, because
of a possible chilling effect, is to effectively disrupt the balance of
competing interests previously established by Sullivan. 115
The Second Circuit's recognition of an absolute privilege for the
editorial process is surely a quantum leap in the area of libel. OFur-
thermore, since the court fb'und that the privilege existed within the
ambit of the First Amendment, it is arguable that the privilege is not
limited to libel cases but applicable to other civil and criminal cases as
well. That the decision in Lando may have exceeded itself is reflected by
the fact that the United States Supreme Court has granted Herbert's
113. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
114. As pointed out by Judge Haight:
The second species of unprotected false statements is at once more subtle, complex
and subjective. The concept of 'reckless disregard for truth' inevitably carries the
trier of the facts into the thought processes of the defendant: the evaluation and
balancing he made of conflicting information available to him; the misgivings he
may have suppressed when deciding to publish.
Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
115. Judge Meskill remarked in his dissenting opinion:
Under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), he may prevail if he
proves that the defendants acted with 'actual malice' that is, knowing or reckless
disregard of the truth. The major purpose of this lawsuit, therefore, is to expose the
defendants' subjective state of mind - their thoughts, beliefs, opinions, intentions,
motives and conclusions - to the light of judicial review. Obviously, such a review
has a 'chilling' or deterrent effect. It is supposed to. The discovery by a libel plain-
tiff of an editor's state of mind will not chill First Amendment activity to any greater
extent that it is already being chilled as a result of the very review permitted by
New York Times v. Sullivan. The majority's attempt to eliminate or reduce that chill
is supportable in neither precedent nor logic.
568 F.2d at 995-96 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
One case has already chosen to apply the holding in Lando. In Jenoff v. The Hearst Corp.,
No. H75-692 (Jan. 20, 1978), the plaintiff Leonard Jenoff filed a libel suit in the United States
District Court of Maryland. During pre-trial discovery Jenoff requested the court to allow him
to continue the deposition of an employee of the defendant who claimed that certain informa-
tion in a letter was privileged nder the editorial process. While the court held in an oral
opinion that the deponent had waived any privilege he might have had by answering questions
candidly in a previous deposition, the court also stated "that if this case did squarely present the
question as to whether Herbert should apply, my answer would be no. . . .The Supreme Court
cases cited in Herbert v. Lando do not, in my opinion, recognize any such privilege in a case of
this sort. I would agree completely with the dissent of Circuit Judge Meskill. Id. at 6.
568 F.2d at 995-96 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
1284
HERBERT V. LANDO
petition for certiorari.116 While the Court may use this decision as a
means to further clarify and refine previous constitutional doctrine or
to espose a new approach altogether, it would seem that as to the
privilege issue, the Court at best should recognize only a qualified
privilege for the editorial process thereby forcing the lower court to
at least apply the compelling need test. Given the Supreme Court's
treatment of those issues affecting the press in recent cases, 117 it is
questionable whether the Court would be willing to go even this fhr.
Michael R. Callahan
116. 98 S.Ct. 1483 (1978).
117. See, e.g., Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978). In this case, the
Court held that neither the First nor Fourth Amendments forbade law enforcement officials
from obtaining warrants to search the possessions of any non-suspect third parties so long as
there existed probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime could be found at a specific
location. The Court made this decision despite a unanimous claim by the media that such
searches of newspaper offices would severely inhibit the functioning of the press.
1978] 1285

